List of firms how superior performance cannot be explained by randomness
Andy Henderson and his coauthors have done us a great service. They are analyzed last decades to find a list of firms whose superior performance cannot be explained by randomness.
Although sustained superior firm performance may arise from skillful management or other valuable, rare, and inimitable resources, it can also result from randomness. Studying U.S. companies from 1965–2008, we benchmark how long a firm must perform at a high level to be confident that it is something other than the outcome of a time-homogeneous stationary Markov chain defined on the state space of percentiles. We find (a) the number of sustained superior performers in Compustat, measured by ROA and Tobin’s q, exceeds the number of false positives we would expect to be generated by such a process; yet (b) the occurrence of false positives is often enough to fool many observers, so (c) the identification of sustained superior performers requires particularly stringent benchmarks to enable valid study.
Read Full Article
Click on More to see the list of firms.


Jonathan Ives explains the design process at Apple
Here he pays tribute to Steve Jobs and explains more about their relationship.
1985 Steve Jobs is fired, Bill Gates sends letter to John Sculley urging him to license Mac OS
Neal Pancholi drew my attention to this interesting letter by Bill Gates. It shows that Gates in 1985 was sill open to making his fortune my selling Mac software rather than dominating the next generation OS.
To: John Sculley, Jean Louis Gassée
From: Bill Gates, Jeff Raikes
Date: June 25, 1985
Re: Apple Licensing of Mac Technologycc: Jon Shirley
Background
Apple’s stated position in personal computers is innovative technology leader. This position implies that Apple must create a standard on new, advanced technology. They must establish a “revolutionary” architecture, which necessarily implies new development incompatible with existing architectures.
Apple must make Macintosh a standard. But no personal computer company, not even IBM, can create a standard without independent support. Even though Apple realized this, they have not been able to gain the independent support required to be perceived as a standard.
The significant investment (especially independent support) in a “standard personal computer” results in an incredible momentum for its architecture. Specifically, the IBM PC architecture continues to receive huge investment and gains additional momentum. (Though clearly the independent investment in the Apple II, and the resulting momentum, is another great example.) The investment in the IBM architecture includes development of differentiated compatibles, software and peripherals; user and sales channel education; and most importantly, attitudes and perceptions that are not easily changed.
Any deficiencies in the IBM architecture are quickly eliminated by independent support. Hardware deficiencies are remedied in two ways:
expansion cards made possible because of access to the bus (e.g. the high resolution Hercules graphics card for monochrome monitors)
manufacture of differentiated compatibles (e.g. the Compaq portable, or the faster DeskPro).
The closed architecture prevents similar independent investment in the Macintosh. The IBM architecture, when compared to the Macintosh, probably has more than 100 times the engineering resources applied to it when investment of compatible manufacturers is included. The ratio becomes even greater when the manufacturers of expansion cards are included.
Conclusion
As the independent investment in a “standard” architecture grows, so does the momentum for that architecture. The industry has reached the point where it is now impossible for Apple to create a standard out of their innovative technology without support from, and the resulting credibility of other personal computer manufacturers. Thus, Apple must open the Macintosh architecture to have the independent support required to gain momentum and establish a standard.
The Mac has not become a standard
The Macintosh has failed to attain the critical mass necessary for the technology to be considered a long term contender:
Since there is no “competition” to Apple from “Mac-compatible” manufacturers, corporations consider it risky to be locked into the Mac, for reasons of price AND choice.
Apple has reinforced the risky perception of the machine by being slow to come out with software and hardware improvements (e.g. hard disk, file server, bigger screen, better keyboard, larger memory, new ROM, operating software with improved performance). Furthermore, killing the Macintosh X/L (Lisa) eliminated the alternative model that many businesses considered necessary.
Recent negative publicity about Apple hinders the credibility of the Macintosh as a long term contender in the personal computer market.
Independent software and hardware manufacturers reinforced the risky perception of the machine by being slow to come out with key software and peripheral products.
Apple’s small corporate account sales force has prevented it from having the presence, training, support, etc. that large companies would recognize and require.
Nationalistic pressures in European countries often force foreign to consumers [sic] choose local manufacturers. Europeans have local suppliers of the IBM architecture, but not Apple. Apple will lose ground in Europe as was recently exhibited in France.
Recommendation
Apple should license Macintosh technology to 3-5 significant manufacturers for the development of “Mac Compatibles”:
United States manufacturers and contacts:
Ideal companies—in addition to credibility, they have large account sales forces that can establish the Mac architecture in larger companies:
AT&T, James Edwards
Wang, An Wang
Digital Equipment Corporation, Ken Olsen
Texas Instruments, Jerry Junkins
Hewlett Packard, John Young
Other companies (but perhaps more realistic candidates):
Xerox, Elliott James or Bob Adams
Motorola, Murray A. Goldman
Harris/Lanier, Wes Cantrell
NBI, Thomas S. Kavanagh
Burroughs, W. Michael Blumenthal and Stephen Weisenfeld
Kodak
3M
CPT
European manufacturers:
Siemens
Bull
Olivetti
Phillips
Apple should license the Macintosh technology to US and European companies in a way that allows them to go to other companies for manufacturing. Sony, Kyocera, and Alps are good candidates for OEM manufacturing of Mac compatibles.
Microsoft is very willing to help Apple implement this strategy. We are familiar with the key manufacturers, their strategies and strengths. We also have a great deal of experience in OEMing system software.
Rationale
The companies that license Mac technology would add credibility to the Macintosh architecture.
These companies would broaden the available product offerings through their “Mac-compatible” product lines:
they would each innovate and add features to the basic system: various memory configurations, video display and keyboard alternatives, etc.
Apple would lever the key partners’ abilities to produce a wide variety of peripherals, much faster than Apple could develop the peripherals themselves.
customers would see competition and would have real price/performance choices.
Apple will benefit from the distribution channels of these companies.
The perception of a significantly increased potential installed base will bring the independent hardware, software, and marketing support that the Macintosh needs.
Apple will gain significant, additional marketing support. Everytime a Mac compatible manufacturer advertises, it is an advertisement for the Apple architecture.
Licensing Mac compatibles will enhance Apple’s image as a technological innovator. Ironically, IBM is viewed as being a technological innovator. This is because compatible manufacturers are afraid to innovate too much and stray from the standard.
Source: Letters of Note
The Coevolution of Industries and Important Features of Their Environments
As the rate of innovation increases, organizational environments are becoming faster and more complex, posing greater challenges for organizations to adapt. This study argues that the concept of coevolution offers a bridge between the prescient adaptationist and ex post selectionist perspectives of organizational change to account for the increasing rates of change. The mutual causal influences in a coevolutionary relationship help explain why competing sets of firms or individual firms can capture dominant shares in product markets. Using a comparative historical method and drawing on evidence from five countries over a 60-year period, this paper inquires how precisely coevolutionary processes work in shaping the evolution of industries and important features of their environments. It identifies—in the context of the synthetic dye industry—three causal mechanisms (exchange of personnel, commercial ties, and lobbying) and suggests how they acted as levers on the fundamental mechanisms of evolution. Understanding the levers is important for managing change in a world that is increasingly becoming coevolutionary, requiring managers to focus more on the emergent, system-level properties of their environments. Download Article.
Tim Cook in a wide-ranging interview talks Apple today (Feb 2011) and future directions
On Tuesday, Apple CEO Tim Cook spoke at the Goldman Sachs Technology and Internet Conference, where he was interviewed on stage by Bill Shope, Goldman Sachs’s IT hardware analyst. Here’s an edited transcript of what Cook had to say on a variety of topics, ranging from working conditions at Apple’s Chinese suppliers to Apple’s culture and ethos. Transcript
Regional institutions, ownership transformation, and migration of industrial leadership in China
Scholars have emphasized the gradual ownership transformation of enterprises as a key driver of the Chinese economy’s unprecedented growth. However, little work has been done on the issue of whether this transformation process takes place evenly across the various regions in China. This article describes the important role of regional institutions in shaping the ownership-based competitiveness of local enterprises and the migration of industries across regions. In the case of the Chinese synthetic dye industry, the passing of leadership from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to collectively owned enterprises (COEs) and then to private enterprises (PEs) was accompanied by a concurrent leadership migration from one region to another. The article contends that this simultaneous occurrence was not accidental. Four institutional constraints—the degree of central supervision, the local labor arrangements, the local social welfare provision, and the degree of ambiguity in property rights—retarded the rise of new ownership forms in the previously dominant regions. This gave other regions the opening to take over leadership positions by providing a more favorable institutional context for new ownership forms. These findings are likely to apply to all of the Chinese manufacturing industries that existed prior to 1978 and that subsequently did not experience significant technological changes and were not highly protected by the government. Download Article
- Did the smart money get out of the Facebook stock? http://t.co/ymmOEZp7
- Goal Setting Works! http://t.co/kjhu2L3a
- Harvard and MIT shake-up online education with a new partnership. http://t.co/tCvdLU7z
- I started researching that water industry. This article will give you "food" for thought. http://t.co/C5uJhVZW




